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| − | Nirvana fallacy
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| − | From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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| − | The nirvana fallacy is a name given to the informal fallacy of comparing actual things with unrealistic, idealized alternatives.[1] It can also refer to the tendency to assume that there is a perfect solution to a particular problem. A closely related concept is the perfect solution fallacy.
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| − | By creating a false dichotomy that presents one option which is obviously advantageous—while at the same time being completely implausible—a person using the nirvana fallacy can attack any opposing idea because it is imperfect. Under this fallacy, the choice is not between real world solutions; it is, rather, a choice between one realistic achievable possibility and another unrealistic solution that could in some way be "better".
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| − | Contents
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| − | 1 History
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| − | 2 Perfect solution fallacy
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| − | 2.1 Examples
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| − | 3 See also
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| − | 4 References
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| − | 5 Further reading
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| − | History
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| − | In La Bégueule (1772), Voltaire wrote Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien, which is often translated as "The perfect is the enemy of the good" (literally: "The best is the enemy of the good").[citation needed]
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| − | The nirvana fallacy was given its name by economist Harold Demsetz in 1969,[2][3] who said:[1]
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| − | The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing "imperfect" institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements.
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| − | Perfect solution fallacy
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| − | This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (March 2015)
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| − | The perfect solution fallacy is a related informal fallacy that occurs when an argument assumes that a perfect solution exists or that a solution should be rejected because some part of the problem would still exist after it were implemented. This is an example of black and white thinking, in which a person fails to see the complex interplay between multiple component elements of a situation or problem, and, as a result, reduces complex problems to a pair of binary extremes.
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| − | It is common for arguments which commit this fallacy to omit any specifics about exactly how, or how badly, a proposed solution is claimed to fall short of acceptability, expressing the rejection only in vague terms. Alternatively, it may be combined with the fallacy of misleading vividness, when a specific example of a solution's failure is described in emotionally powerful detail but base rates are ignored (see availability heuristic).
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| − | The fallacy is a type of false dilemma.
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| − | Examples
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| − | Posit (fallacious)
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| − | These anti-drunk driving ad campaigns are not going to work. People are still going to drink and drive no matter what.
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| − | Rebuttal
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| − | Complete eradication of drunk driving is not the expected outcome. The goal is reduction.
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| − | Posit (fallacious)
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| − | Seat belts are a bad idea. People are still going to die in car crashes.
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| − | Rebuttal
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| − | While seat belts cannot make driving 100% safe, they do reduce one's likelihood of dying in a car crash.
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| − | Posit (fallacious)
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| − | The Umpire Decision Review System (in cricket) is a bad idea. It can't fix all missed calls.
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| − | Rebuttal
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| − | While not all umpiring errors are corrected under the UDRS, it does reduce the number of errors made.
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| − | See also
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| − | Appeal to consequences
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| − | Cherry picking
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| − | Choice-supportive bias
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| − | Confirmation bias
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| − | Emotional memory
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| − | Fallacy
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| − | Formal fallacy
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| − | Groupthink
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| − | Magical thinking
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| − | Optimism bias
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| − | Pollyanna principle
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| − | Self-deception
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| − | Self-fulfilling prophecy
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| − | Self-serving bias
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| − | Truthiness
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| − | Valence effect
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| − | Validity
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| − | Wishful thinking
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| − | References
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| − | H. Demsetz, "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint", Journal of Law and Economics 12 (April 1969): 1, quoted in Kirzner, Israel M. (1978). Competition and Entrepreneurship. p. 231. ISBN 0-226-43776-0.
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| − | Leeson, Peter T. (2007-08-06). "Anarchy unbound, or: why self-governance works better than you think". Cato Unbound. Cato Institute. Retrieved 2009-07-01.
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| − | Shapiro, Daniel (2007). Is the welfare state justified?. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 4. ISBN 0-521-86065-2.
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| − | Further reading
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| − | Browne, M Neil; Keeley, Stuart M (2004). Asking the right questions: a guide to critical thinking (7th. ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-182993-0. OCLC 50813342.
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| − | [hide]
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| − | v
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| − | t
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| − | e
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| − |
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| − | Informal fallacies
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| − | Correlative-based fallacies
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| − | False dilemma (Perfect solution fallacy)
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| − | Denying the correlative
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| − | Suppressed correlative
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| − | Fallacies of illicit transference
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| − | Composition
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| − | Division
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| − | Deductive fallacies
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| − | Accident
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| − | Converse accident
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| − | Inductive fallacies
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| − | Sampling bias (Cherry picking
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| − | McNamara fallacy)
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| − | Base rate fallacy / Conjunction fallacy
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| − | False analogy
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| − | Hasty generalization / Slothful induction
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| − | Misleading vividness
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| − | Overwhelming exception
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| − | Questionable cause
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| − | Animistic (Furtive)
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| − | Correlation proves causation (Cum hoc ergo propter hoc)
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| − | Gambler's (inverse)
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| − | Post hoc
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| − | Regression
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| − | Single cause
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| − | Slippery slope
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| − | Texas sharpshooter
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| − | Third-cause
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| − | Wrong direction
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| − | Vagueness / ambiguity
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| − | Accent
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| − | Amphibology
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| − | Continuum fallacy / Sorites paradox
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| − | False precision
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| − | Slippery slope
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| − | Equivocation
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| − | Equivocation
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| − | False attribution
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| − | Quoting out of context
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| − | Loki's Wager
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| − | No true Scotsman
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| − | Reification
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| − | Question-begging fallacies
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| − | Circular reasoning / Begging the question
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| − | Loaded language (Leading question)
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| − | Compound question / Loaded question
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| − | No true Scotsman
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| − | List-Class article List of fallacies
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| − | Category Other types of fallacy
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| − | Portal Philosophy portal
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| − | Categories:
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| − | Logical fallacies
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| − | </pre>
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| − | <hr>
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| − | <hr>
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| − | <hr>
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| | :;Rebuttal | | :;Rebuttal |
| | ::While not all umpiring errors are corrected under the UDRS, it does reduce the number of errors made. | | ::While not all umpiring errors are corrected under the UDRS, it does reduce the number of errors made. |
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| − | == See also ==
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| − | * [[Appeal to consequences]]
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| − | * [[Cherry picking (fallacy)|Cherry picking]]
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| − | * [[Choice-supportive bias]]
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| − | * [[Confirmation bias]]
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| − | * [[Emotional memory]]
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| − | * [[Fallacy]]
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| − | * [[Formal fallacy]]
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| − | * [[Groupthink]]
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| − | * [[Magical thinking]]
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| − | * [[Optimism bias]]
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| − | * [[Pollyanna principle]]
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| − | * [[Self-deception]]
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| − | * [[Self-fulfilling prophecy]]
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| − | * [[Self-serving bias]]
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| − | * [[Truthiness]]
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| − | * [[Valence effect]]
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| − | * [[Validity]]
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| − | * [[Wishful thinking]]
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| − |
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| − | == References ==
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| − | {{reflist}}
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| − | == Further reading ==
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| − | *{{cite book |title= Asking the right questions: a guide to critical thinking|last1= Browne|first1= M Neil|last2= Keeley|first2= Stuart M|year= 2004|edition= 7th.|publisher=[[Pearson Prentice Hall]]|location= Upper Saddle River, NJ|isbn= 978-0-13-182993-0|oclc= 50813342}}
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| − | {{Informal Fallacy}}
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| − | {{DEFAULTSORT:Nirvana Fallacy}}
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| − | [[Category:Logical fallacies]]
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The perfect solution fallacy is a related informal fallacy that occurs when an argument assumes that a perfect solution exists or that a solution should be rejected because some part of the problem would still exist after it were implemented. This is an example of black and white thinking, in which a person fails to see the complex interplay between multiple component elements of a situation or problem, and, as a result, reduces complex problems to a pair of binary extremes.
It is common for arguments which commit this fallacy to omit any specifics about exactly how, or how badly, a proposed solution is claimed to fall short of acceptability, expressing the rejection only in vague terms. Alternatively, it may be combined with the fallacy of misleading vividness, when a specific example of a solution's failure is described in emotionally powerful detail but base rates are ignored (see availability heuristic).
